

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 4995

EXDIS

FOR AMB MCCLOSKEY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, SP, US

SUBJ: US-SPANISH NEGOTIATIONS

1. I HAD LUNCH ALONE WITH ROVIRA JULY 17. HE HAD JUST READ A COPY OF THE PAPER THAT I HAD GIVEN TO CORTINA AND WE DISCUSSED THIS AT SOME LENGTH. I TOLD HIM THAT IF WE WERE TO GO ON DISCUSSING CORTINA'S POINT BACK AND FORTH, WE WOULD NEVER GET ANYWHERE SINCE WHAT CORTINA WAS ASKING WAS UNREALISTIC AND UNATTAINABLE. WE OUGHT TO GET ON WITH DEFINING A US-SPANISH RELATIONSHIP WHICH WAS ADEQUATE NOT ONLY IN THAT MORE NARROW CONTEXT, BUT IN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF WESTERN DEFENSE IN WHICH SPAIN SHOULD HAVE A SELFISH INTEREST. I TOLD ROVIRA THAT WE WOULD GET NOWHERE WITH THE NATO ALLIES ALONG THE LINES CORTINA WANTED. ROVIRA INQUIRED WHETHER WE COULD NOT TELL THE ALLIES THAT IF WE WERE OBLIGED TO GIVE UP OUR FACILITIES IN SPAIN, WE COULD NO LONGER ASSURE THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES IN EUROPE. I TOLD ROVIRA THAT SUCH AN ARGUMENT WOULD BE TOTALLY LACKING IN CREDIBILITY AND TOTALLY INCONSISTENT WITH OUR DEFENSE STRATEGY. PERSONALLY, I DO NOT THINK THAT ROVIRA SHARES CORTINA'S VIEW ON THIS NATO QUESTION, BUT I SUPPOSE HE HAS NO CHOICE BUT TO GO ALONG WITH IT.

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PAGE 02 MADRID 04995 181219Z

2. ROVIRA THEN WENT ON TO TELL ME THAT AT THE NATIONAL

DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETING ON JULY 14, HE HAD BEEN GIVEN QUITE A HARD TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ASTOUNDED TO HEAR THAT ROVIRA HAD GIVEN ROTA BACK TO US AND INQUIRED HOW HE HAD DONE THIS WITHOUT RECEIVING A US GUARANTEE. THE COMMENTS HAD BEEN MADE THAT HE HAD GIVEN US ROTA IN EXCHANGE FOR THE RATHER SMALL SUM OF \$500 MILLION IN CREDITS OVER FIVE YEARS AND AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT GUARANTEE, TO BE APPROVED BY CONGRESS. CERTAIN MINISTERS HAD MADE THE COMMENT THAT SPAIN COULD OBTAIN CREDITS TO BUY MILITARY EQUIPMENT AT BETTER TERMS FROM SWITZERLAND AND THE ARAB COUNTRIES, INCLUDING KUWAIT, AND THEY BUY THAT EQUIPMENT IN FRANCE AND SWEDEN. ROVIRA SAID THAT HE HAD ARGUED THAT HE HAD CONCEDED ROTA TO US ON THE BASIS THAT IT REPRESENTED A NUCLEAR DETERRENT AGAINST SOVIET ATTACK WHICH NOT ONLY PROTECTED SPAIN AS SUCH, BUT BY BEING A DETERRENT REDUCED THE RISK. ROVIRA COMMENTED THAT HE WAS NOW UNDER INSTRUCTION TO MAKE SOME PRESENTATION IN THE WASHINGTON ROUND RESERVING THE PREVIOUS SPANISH POSITION CONCEDING ROTA TO US.

3. ROVIRA ALSO TOLD ME THAT AT THE JULY 14 MEETING, REFERENCE HAD BEEN MADE TO THE PRESIDENT'S TOAST AT THE STATE DINNER ON MAY 31, WHEN HE HAD REFERRED TO SPANISH CONTRIBUTIONS TO WESTERN DEFENSE AND THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES THAT SHOULD FLOW FROM SUCH CONTRIBUTIONS. THERE HAD BEEN SOME DISSATISFIED REMARKS BY CERTAIN OF THE MINISTERS THAT IF THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES WERE TO BE LIMITED TO \$500 MILLION IN CREDITS OVER FIVE YEARS, THE CONSEQUENCES WERE NOT PRACTICAL ENOUGH. (I KNOW FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER OF THE PRESIDENCY CARRO MARTINEZ ON JULY 15 THAT HE IS CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MINISTERS WHO THINKS IN THESE TERMS.)

4. I ASKED ROVIRA WHAT INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD AND WHAT HE PROPOSED FOR THE ROUND BEGINNING ON MONDAY. HE REPLIED THAT THE SPANISH DELEGATION HOPED FOR MORE DETAILED COMMENTS FROM YOU WITH REGARD TO HIS PRESENTATION ON THE MORNING OF JULY 3 AND FURTHER WORK ON THE EQUIPMENT LIST. I SAID THAT I ONLY HOPED THAT AS A RESULT OF THE DOCUMENT I HAD GIVEN CORTINA, HE MIGHT RECEIVE SOME NEW INSTRUCTIONS, SINCE IT HARDLY SEEMED PROFITABLE TO CONTINUE MUCH LONGER THIS DIALOGUE ON THE NATO ANGLE. IT WAS TIME TO GET DOWN TO DEFINING OUR RELATIONSHIP BASED ON SOLID REALITIES, IT BEING ASSUMED THAT SPAIN STILL WISHED TO HAVE A DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US.

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